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W

e have seen extraordinary changes in the role of the military within domestic American society since September 11, 2001. The National Defense Authorization Act of 2003 created the office that I now hold. The statutory
mission assigned to the assistant secretary of defense for homeland defense wasand is-to supclVise all of the homeland defense activities of the Department of
Defense. In short, to supervise the domestic role of the US military, to include both
the warfightingdefense of the United States and the consequence management activities of the Department of Defense when providing support to civilian authorities. That is a sobering mission. It reflects the intent of Congress to bring a special
geographic focus to the department that reflects the paramount security considerations associated with the immediate defense of the American people. It is a mission that sobers me every morning.

Constitutional Principles
When I was asked to take this position I thought seriously about the role of the military within domestic society, the historic and statutory constraints upon that role
and the appropriate opportunity within the boundaries of those constraints for the
.. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense.

The opinions shared in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions
of the U.S. Naval War College, the Dept. of the Navy, or Dept. of Defense.

Domestic Security and Maintenance of Liberty: Striking the Balance
US armed forces to make a contribution to the physical security of the American
people. It required me to re-examine some first principles of constitutional government and the effective protection of civilian democratic principles so deeply
em bedded in our US Constitution.
With that as motivation, I returned to the Federalist papers. I selVed three terms
in the House of Representatives in the 1990s. When I left the House, I decided to
read the Federalist papers in their entirety. Like many political science majors, I
had read portions-Federalist 10 and Federalist 51-but I had never read all
eighty-five from beginning to end.
I think most of you participating in this conference are fam iliar to at least some
degree with the Federalist papers. For those of you in the international community
who may not be familiar with them, just let me briefly set the stage. Over the summer of 1787 the Constitution of the United States was written in the city of Philadelphia. The framers of the Constitution finished their work in September 1787.
Then the question became whether or not the required nine of the original thirteen
states would ratify the framers' work. As in any political context there was serious
debate, on this occasion between the federalists and the anti-federalists. That debate was carried on in the newspapers of the day. Between the time of the com pletion of the draft and the ultimate ratification of the Constitution, Alexander
Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay-principally Hamilton and Madisonwrote eighty-five op-ed pieces. Those commentaries were ultimately bound together into the published work that we know today as Tile Federalist. I
There are legal scholars who believe that The Federalist may be the finest work
oflegal literat ure ever written in the English language. A few years ago Professor
Bernard Schwartz, Chapman Distinguished Professor of Law at the University of
Tulsa, came up with his list of the top ten legal books ever written in the English
language; at the top of the list was The Federa/ist. 2 I'm not sure that I would go that
far, but I knew when I retired from Congress I wanted to read the Federalist papers.
I knew that the only way in which I would have the discipline to do so would be if I
volunteered to teach a course on the Federalist papers at one of the colleges in my
hometown. So I returned to Pennsylvania and taught a course on the Federalist papers for a year or so staying about three papers ahead of the students and developing my expertise in explaining their meaning.
Federalist Paper No.8 talks with specificity about the role of the military within
the borders of our nation; it is a cautionary message. When I first read Alexander
Hamilton's words I thought they were an anachronism. He was concerned that the
role of the military would become too intrusive within domestic American society.
He feared that if that role were to be too powerful the character of our nation and
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the core principles of the Constitution would be adversely affected. Those fears
were expressed in the fo llowing words (to which 1 have added my own thoughts):
Safety from external danger is the most powerful director of national conduct. Even the
ardent love of liberty will, after a time, give way to its dictates. The violent destruction
of life and property incident to war [think September 11 J, the continual effort and
alarm attendant on a state of continual danger [think al-QaedaJ, will compel nations
the most attached to liberty to resort for repose and security to institutions which have
a tendency to destroy their civil and political rights. To be more safe, they at length
become willing to run the risk of being less free.3
Later in Federalist 8 he talks very specifically about the US military in a manner
that, I think, was prescient. When I studied government in college and first looked
at the Federalist papers and firs t considered the role of the military, I knew there
was concern among our fo unders related to a large standing army. The im plication
was that a large standing army would by brute force impose military values upon a
civilian government and a republican Constitution. The fo rce of arms would be
seen as the danger.
That is not the rationale of Federalist 8-it's much more sophisticated, much
more nuanced. It is not about brute force; it is about the choice to sacrifice liberty
in order to achieve security. Hamilton wrote about nations that are internally secure from external attack, as opposed to nations which remain internally subject to
foreign attack; again thinkal-Qaeda. The twenty- fi rst-century reality, at least from
our perspective within the Department of Defense, is that the United States is now
an inherent, integrated element of a global battlespace from the vantage point of
transnational terrorists.4 Indeed, I think it could be argued successfully that, from
the terrorist standpoint, we are the pre-eminent element of that battles pace. Their
intent is not to achieve victory through a war of attrition but to bring brutality into
the internal confines of the United States. By bringing death and destruction to our
citizens, they believe they can affect our political will. Well short of success in terms
of attrition, they believe they can shape our political conscious by acts of brutality
and if they can succeed in engaging in such acts within the United States they will
have achieved pre-eminent success.
Alexander Hamilton wrote of nations that must fear that kind of internal attack
versus those that are relatively secure within a domestic setting. Let me take those
in reverse order the way Hamilton did. He wrote, "[ t Jhere is a wide difference .. .
between military establishments in a country seldom exposed by its situation to inter nal invasions . .. ."5 A recent example of such a country would be the United
States during the Cold War when there was little danger of attack upon our territory. In this, the first case, the civil state remains in full vigor:
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The smallness of the army renders the natural strength of the community an
overmatch for it; and the citizens. not habituated to look up to the military power fo r
protection, or to submit to its oppressions, neither love nor fear the soldiery; they view
them with a spirit of jealous acquiescence in a necessary evil... f'
Hamilton then goes on to address, by contrast, the state of a nation that is " o ften
subject to them [internal invasionsl. and always ap prehensive of them."1 Sin ce
Septem ber 11. 200 1 we in the Un ited States. on a daily basis. remain uncertain as a
matter of harsh reality as to when and under what circumstances our transnational
terrorist adversaries might again strike us internally. Three thousand people Were
killed on our own soil on September 11th. Another attack could conceivably occur
tomorrow so we remain subject to that continuing threat. Describing a nation in
that circumstance. Hamilton wrote (again with the insertion of my thoughts):
in a country, in the predicament last described, the contrary of all this happens. The
perpetual menacings of danger [al-QaedaJ oblige the government to be always
prepared to repel it.
. The continual necessity for their services enhances the
importance of the soldier, and proportionably degrades the condition of the citizen.
The military state becomes elevated above the civil. The inhabitants .. . are unavoidably
subjected to frequent infringements on their rights, which serve to weaken their sense
of those rights; and by degrees, the people are brought to consider the soldiery not only
as their protectors, but as their superiors. The transition from this disposition to that of
considering them as masters, is neither remote, nor difficult. But it is very difficult to
prevail upon a people under such impressions, to make a bold, or effectual resistance,
to usurpations, supported by the military power.s
Hamilton's concern was that if we allowed ourselves to get to the point where we
were dis proportionately depen dent upon the military for internal security then we
in the military would becom e the saviors o f society an d citizens would no longer
trust civilian government to provide for their physical security. The citizenry
would conclude. perhaps correctly. that only the m ilitary could p rovide for its internal security. Once that recognition occurred. th e m ilitary would be seen as the
masters an d, ultimately. the leaders an d superiors of society. In short, not brute
force but rather the volun tary relinq uishment of the civilian ch aracter o f our government would raise the role of the military disproportionately and ultimately
threaten th e civilian character of our Constitution. It would n ot be by force but by
choice that the ch aracter of our nation would ch ange because of the core mistake of
allowing a disproportionate dependen ce upon military power for in ternal security.
rather than a core dependen ce upon civilian law en forcem en t an d civilian capabilities to guarantee that same security.
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Striking the Balance
Those were sobering thoughts fo r me when I was nominated for the position in
which I now serve and those have remained sobering thoughts guiding me and
many others with whom I work. On a daily basis we consider the roles of the military and civilian government and civilian capabilities when achieving security
within our own borders. Obviously when we begin to address national security issues in terms of power projection and the ability to take the fight to the enemy
overseas, the role of the military historically has been dominant. In my judgment
that is correct. When we seek out terrorists and their supporters in places like Afghanistan and Iraq, men and women in military uniform are at the vanguard of our
nation's effort to achieve physical security. We send men and women in the armed
forces forward in a lead role to engage the enemy and defeat such enemy attacks.
But within our own country, it remains an issue of constant, sobering judgment to
remain loyal and committed to the preservation of the civilian character of our
government and the democratic nature of our Constitution, and, within that balance, properly employ the military in a manner that will enhance our security,
while ensuring it remains ultimately subordinate to dear and decisive civilian authority, which in tum will ensure the civilian character of our government. That is
the nature of the challenge. There are many things we can do with military power
within our own borders in order to achieve the security of the American people
while not endangering the civilian character of o ur Constitution. But that is a
continuing issue of sober assessment. We ought not blindly commit military
fo rces to missions that should remain inherently civilian in character. If we use
the military within our own borders fo r every mission that the military in theory
could achieve, we will, in fact, tip the balance towards security and pay a price in
terms of liberty.
Thus, the question becomes how do you strike that balance? The remainder of
my remarks will touch upon certain specific areas of operational activity where
there are significant legal implications. But as I go through these challenges, both
operational and legal, in each and every case I urge you to consider them in the
continuing context of that balance between security and liberty and between the
role of the military and the role of civilian government within the boundaries of
domestic American society. Underlying the determination of that balance is the
overarching requirement that those roles be consistent with the civilian core principles of the US Constitution.
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H om eland Secu rity
It became operationally clear-indeed it was instinctively obvious- that in light of
the attack we had experienced on September 11th there was a need for enhanced
physical security within the borders of our nation; the enemy had struck and might
do so again. The Department of Defense, acting with operational prudence, created
rapid reaction forces that could act within our own country. US Army and Marine
Corps forces, in a classified number, were placed on alert for potential domestic deployment of military force in order to defeat a follow-on al-Qaeda attack. It was
clear that having struck us once the enemy might strike us again and that there was
a role for military power in defeating such a fore ign attack on our soil.
When I was confirmed as assistant secretary of defense for homeland defense
and began to exercise the responsibilities and authority of supervising the homeland defense activities of the Department of Defense, I determined that having
rapid reaction Army and Marine Corps ground forces on alert fo r domestic deployment was a reasonable course of action. But as a lawyer I asked myself, "Is that
constitutional?" Is the ground deployment of US Army forces consistent with the
Posse Comitatus Act of 1878?9 How do we deploy soldiers on our own soil in a
manner consistent with the Constitution when to do so may potentially conflict
with the posse comitatus statute?1O How do we reconcile the need to defend against
another potential al-Qaeda attack with the Constitution and the law?
I know there are individuals in the audience today from a nation-State that is
today an extremely close friend and ally of the United States. But in 18 12 that nationState-I am not going to say which one----deployed ground forces to the United
States. Those ground forces left, shall we say, a lasting impact upon the Capitol
of our nation. While those forces were en route to the capital, US Marines were
employed at Bladensburg, Maryland to defend against that attack. We were not
quite as successful as we hoped we would be, but we utilized US military forces to
defend our own soil under the same Constitution with which we live today
against a foreign attack in order to save American lives and defend American
property.
The Constitution has not fun damentally changed in that regard. Article 2 of the
Constitution provides "The President shall be commander in chief of the Army and
Navy of the United States .... "11 That executive power remains essentially the same
today as it was 1814 when the defense of the capital occurred. As I thought it through,
I turned to the US Army's Domestic Operatiotlal Law Hatldbook where I read about
the Military Purpose Doctrine. ll The Military Purpose Doctrine states that the Posse
Comitatus Act does not apply to those missions which arc being executed primarily for a military purpose. The use of force fo r purposes other than arrest, search
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and seizure is not proscribed by posse comitatus. When those Marines were deployed in Bladensburg in 18 14 they weren't there to arrest anybody and when we
established quick reaction forces in the wake of September I I th the purpose was
not law enforcement but warfighting on our own soil as it had taken place d uring
the War of 1812 and, some would argue, as lincoln exercised that power during the
Civil War. It was not that the power was not there; it was that we had not used it on
our own soil for a military purpose in quite a long time. But I personally concluded
that the Military Purpose Doctrine allows us to have Army units on alert-and we
continue to have them on alert-prepared for ground deployment within the
United States to defend, for instance, critical infrastruct ure, perhaps a nuclear
power plant, against a transnational terrorist threat.
We do not anticipate, however, that the first several layers of our defense against
a foreign attack on our own soil would be military in character. We emphasize that
the primary dependence is upon civilian law enforcement. But if federal, state and
local law enforcement authorities and ultimately the National Guard cannot physically defend American citizens against a foreign threat on our soil, under the Military Purpose Doctrine and consistent with the Posse Comitatus Act, we do have
quick reaction forces ready to be deployed, not for purposes oflaw enforcement,
but for purposes of warfighting under Article 2 of the Constitution in defense of
the American people.

Responding to Natural Disasters
Having considered and addressed the use of military forces for defensive purposes,
we then encountered the issue of the utilization of US military capabilities within
US borders in the event of a natural disaster. Hurricane Katrina emphasized the
challenges associated not with warfighting but the statutoI)' authority related to incident management. Arguably the worst natural disaster in American histol)' took
place on August 29, 2005 when Hurricane Katrina came ashore along the Gulf
Coast. Nearly two thousand lives were lost; the damage is measured in the billions
of dollars. The performance of the US military in response to what were truly horrific circumstances was by most accounts superbly competent. That is not to say
that the response to catastrophic events cannot be im proved upon, b ut the simple
fact is that the military response to Hurricane Katrina was arguably the largest, fastest deployment of military capabilities in US history. Between August 29 and September 10, the United States deployed seventy-two thousand milital)' personnelfifty thousand National Guardsmen, twenty-two thousand active duty-to the
Gulf Coast to provide humanitarian relief. Out of that military response came, I
believe, a significant respect for milital)' capabilities, while simultaneously fa irly
9
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harsh criticism was being directed, often with justification, towards some civilian
response authorities.
The discussion began immediately thereafter as to the appropriate role of the
military in response to a catastrophic natural event. The Stafford Act 13 and the
Economy Act,14 as well as other provisions of statutory law, provide the Department of Defense authority to assist a lead civilian agency in responding to a natural
disaster or a man -made event. The issue then becomes: if the military does well in
such circumstances, why not put the military in charge? That, again, raises some of
the issues that were first raised in Federalist 8. President Bush sparked serious and
thoughtful discussion on that issue in a way that I think he consciously intended.
We were able to think through both the opportunities and the challenges associated with the use of military capabilities in providing such a response. There was
discussion in the media and at senior levels of government with regard to the possibility of designating the Department of Defense as the lead federal agency replacing, at least on a temporary basis, the Department of Homeland Security in
providing a federal response to a disaster. Then the lawyers got into the act.
I have learned something from the Department of Justice with regard to the
scope of the executive power under Article 2 of the Constitution and frankly it surprised me; it might not have surprised Hamilton and Madison but it surprised me.
The Department of Justice in a series of opinions, the most fundamental of which
goes back to 2002, concluded that when the Congress of the United States assigns a
certain responsibility by statute to a particular cabinet-level department, the president lacks the authority thereafter to re-delegate that responsibility from the designated agency to another. That theory oflaw cam e into play in preliminary analyses
of the issue of whether or not the authorities assigned to the Department of Homeland Security under the Homeland Security Act of2002 15 could be re-delegated by
the president to the Department of Defense. Some very thoughtful legal scholars,
including some within the Departm ent of Justice, concluded that the president
could not do that.
The Department of Homeland Security has been uniquely and specifically assigned the responsibility as the lead federal agency in responding to catastrophic
events and in consequence management related to disasters. Whether o r not it
makes operational sense to reassign that responsibility, because Congress had spoken on the issue, in the absence of follow-on congressional reconsideration of the
Homeland Security Act of2002, it would appear, at least fo r the time being, that by
law the lead federal agency in responding to natural disasters must remain the Department of Homeland Security.
As lawyers I ask you to consider what a profound impact the law and your profession had on a significant public policy debate. The outcome of that debate, at
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least in the first phase, was conclusively determined by legal analysis. That doesn't
dose the door on a more robust military role, but it means that that military role
will remain, at least under current law, subordinate to a lead federal agency which
is civilian in character. Whether or not one would agree with him, 1 suspect Alexander Hamilton would feel pretty good about that result.
The position of the Office of General Counsel of the Department of Defense is
that we do not need to amend the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 . The Defense Department has concluded the act does not impede in any significant way the military
missions that the Department of Defense has been assigned to execute nor does the
act present an unreasonable impediment to foreseeable military missions within
the United States. Senator Warner and others have, from time to time, said as a
matter of due diligence and prudence that a statute drafted in the Reconstruction
era perhaps ought to be re-examined for its contin ued utility in the vastly different
context of transnational terrorism of the twenty-first century.
I believe without question the terminology of the Posse Comitatus Act is out of
date. We found ourselves, for instance, in the aftermath of Katrina dealing with
civil disorder on the streets of New Orleans. lfwe were to experience a terrorist attack involving a weapon of mass destruction, it is entirely possible that the social
chaos inevitably associated with such a catastrophic event would generate substantial civil disorder. In those circumstances, it might well be that the principles ofthe
Posse Comitatus Act would come into play in terms of the use of Title 10 activeduty military personnel in providing immediate protection of constitutional rights
and enforcement of federa l statutes in circumstances where, for a limited period of
time, civilian law enforcement authorities fo und themselves incapable of guaranteeing those constitutional rights or enforcing those federal statutes.

Counterterrorism
It is those circumstances that authorize the federalization of the National Guard
and the use of the armed forces under the Insurrection Act of 1807.16 But when we
examine transnational terrorism in the context of the Insurrection Act, we are not
really dealing with an insurrection as that act defines it. At a minimum, we need to
re-examine the archaic terminology of the Insurrection and the Posse Comitatus
acts in order to ensure that their language remains consistent with the character of
the threat that we face in the twenty-first century. The Defense Department's position has been that the Posse Comitat us Act does not need to be substantively
amended, but that the terminology of both the Posse Comitatus and the Insurrection acts should be reconsidered in order to ensure the principles oflaw reflected in
those statutes remain relevant to the twenty-first-century threat.

II

Domestic Security and Maintenance of Liberty: Striking the Balance
Can we use the National Guard for domestic counterterrorism missions in
support of civilian law enforcement? I am not certain the law is clear on that
point. That too must be examined, probably by legislative authorities. Congress
about a year ago amended the law to provide that a joint task fo rce OTF) engaged
in counter-narcotic activities, typically along the borders of the United States,
could engage in coun terterrorism activities domestically in support of civilian
law enforcement. It was a very b rief amendment to the law. With virtually no
legislative history, we are still trying to figure out the legislative intent reflected
in that statutory change, but the law now provides that Title 10 active-duty military forces , like JTF North in EI Paso, Texas, may engage in counterterrorism
activity in support of civilian law enfo rcement authorities. There is no analogous provision of law empowering the National Guard to engage in similar missions. As a result, we now have a disparity in the law in which Title 10 forces may
take on such counterterrorism missions, b ut National Guard fo rces may not,
even though they may be colocated.
In the absence of other specific legislation, we find ourselves straining, under
pre-existing authorities not particularly well suited to counterterrorism missions,
to shoehorn what are at least in appearance and perhaps in substance counterterrorism activities into other statutory authority. What r suggest needs to be undertaken, in a sober, serious and deliberative manner, is an effort to better define the
counterterrorism mission assigned to Title 10 joint task forces and the parallel authority, if any, granted to the National Guard to also engage in counterterrorism
activities in support of civilian law enforcement.

Intelligence Support
Another issue that I' m going to be unable to resolve in my remarks, but want to
pose for your consideration, is intelligence support for domestic uses of the armed
forces. When military forces are used within our own borders fo r certain
warfighting, counterterrorism and force protection missions, there is a requirement for intelligence, as is the case fo r all military missions. 1 suspect when those
Marines defended against those unnamed invading forces at Bladensburg in 18 14
they had military intelligence requirements, such as: Where are the enemy forces?
By what means are they moving towards our positions? How many are there and
how are they equipped? In short, the information needed to better anticipate and
respond to the enemy attack.
That requirement is as necessary today as it was then. As we look at the domestic
warfighting responsibilities of both the Title 10 military forces and, under the recent statutory amendment to Title 32, the National Guard, the question arises,
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how. consistent with the civilian character of our government and the preservation
of domestic civil liberties. do we acquire the intelligence information necessary to
support our domestic military missions? There is no easy answer to that question
and determining the answer will require sober judgment. We in the military see
ourselves as consumers. not collectors. of domestic intelligence. I believe the law
sees us as consumers as well. There are provisions of the law. very tightly constrained. that do allow certain military units. such as counterterrorism units. military intelligence units and general utility forces. to collect intelligence domestically.
But. for reasons that are obvious and fundamental to the character of our nation.
the role of the military in collecting domestic intelligence is very tightly and. in my
judgment. appropriately constrained.
The military has statutory authority to collect domestic intelligence that relates
to anti-terrorism fo rce protection. Our terrorist adversaries do see. as indicated
earlier. the United States as a part of the global battlespace. In the context of the
past precedent of the September I I attacks and a continuing threat of domestic attack. anti-terrorism force protection requirements for the military have been
heightened as a military mission as a matter of immediacy.
The question to be considered is. given the force protection mission of conducting an active defense against the transnational terrorist threat within our borders
and given the parameters of existing statutory authority that allow us to collect intelligence domestically for such a purpose, how do we bring to that framework an
appropriate degree of clarity and detail that both enables the successful intelligence
support of those military missions. while avoiding an intrusive and improper engagement in domestic intelligence collection activities by military fo rces? It is part
of the balance that I addressed earlier. It is a balance that is subject to contin uing assessment because of the nature of the threat that we now face domestically and the
role of the military in defending against that threat.

Employment of No n-lethal Weapons
In response to Hurricane Katrina we deployed for either active or contingent
military missions about fifteen thousand security personnel. Most of those military
personnel were deployed to the New O rleans area. You may recall that about four
or five days after Katrina came ashore. the president deployed twenty-two thousand Title to military forces on a humanitarian mission . They were there in conformity with the Posse Comitatus Act and also available for service in anticipation
of invocation of the Insurrection Act if civil disorder had continued within New
Orleans. The soldiers from the Army's 82nd Airborne and 1st Calvary divisions
and Marines from the 1st and 2nd Marine divisions deployed to New Orleans for a
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humanitarian mission. But they also established a military presence and were available, subject to presidential authority, for security missions if the president had
chosen to invoke the Insurrection Act. In addition, we used seven thousand National Guard forces, which were not subject to the Posse Comitatus Act, in direct
law enforcement roles, including over four thousand National Guard military police who actively and lawfully engaged in law enforcement-related activities.
Fifteen thousand men and women in uniform were deployed in the aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina into an area of civil disorder, either directly engaged in security
missions or potentially engaged in such missions. They were neither trained in the
use of nor equipped with non-lethal weapons. In my judgment that was a mistake
and we need to learn from that experience. Imagine, if you will, a need to respond
to a larger catastrophic event, perhaps a terrorist attack involving weapons of mass
destruction, where loss of life and physical devastation might be far worse than
what we experienced during the very difficult and tragic days of Hurricane Katrina.
We could and should anticipate that, in the context of related civil disorder, the
military may have a role to play and that role might include the use oflethal force.
But, again in my judgment, we should not limit the range of options available to
our military commanders. Commanders on the ground should have the flexibility
to restore civil order, protect constitutional rights and p reserve federal statutory
authority with a proportionate degree of force which, in their determinations,
would be sufficient to fulfill mission requirements. The choice should not be passivity versus lethality. We have non-lethal weapons in our inventory that would be
sufficient in many circumstances to maintain or restore civil order without necessarily threatening the actual loss of life.
Certainly the legal issues associated with that are profound. If we deploy soldiers on our own streets in a catastrophic circumstance refl ecting a character of
civil disorder and if we do execute such a deployment for the purpose of preserving
constitutional rights, equal protection of the law for instance, and enforcing other
statutory authorities, what legal authority should be provided? What liability provisions should be enacted in order to ensure the proper employment of such nonlethal capabilities?
I spoke earlier about critical infrastructure protection . If we use military
forces to protect critical infrastructure such as nuclear power plan ts against potential al-Qaeda attacks, we have non-lethal capabilities those forces can employ
that are very high tech in character. Some of those capabilities are quite well developed in terms of technology-microwave beams for instance--and can be used
without risking the loss of life . Defending domestic critical infrastructure under
the same circumstances with rifles and machine guns would pose obvious risks to
the surrounding civilian community. But what are the public policy issues related
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Paul M cHale
to use of non-lethal weapon systems? What are the legal issues? What liability questions are created? What if we were to use interlocking microwave beams to defend a
nudear power plant as a humane alternative to the use of deadly force. such as
M 16s and .sO caliber machine guns?
Non-lethal weapon systems certainly have the potential to effectively defend
critical infrastructure. Lives. includ ing innocent lives in the surrounding communities. could be saved through the use of such systems. But it is almost inevitable
that an innocent person would be struck by a microwave beam. It seems preferable
to me to be struck by a beam as o pposed to a bullet from an M 16. but what are the
liability issues? W hat are the public policy questions that need to be examined? As
with so many of the questions involving the domestic use of military forces. integration of non-lethal weapons into use-of-force capabilities must be preceded by
public debate and legislative deliberation. In that way we can develop a legal fram ework that properly supports the domestic use of non -lethal weapons as a humane
alternative to lethal force.

Who's in Charge?
The H urricane Katrina experience witnessed multiple layers oflocal. state and federal government authorities (civilian and m ilitary) involved in the response without darityofintent and perhaps with some insensitivity to constitutional history. I
therefore ask the rather straightforward question, " Who's in charge?" I know there
are individuals in this audience from Israel. In Israel the answer to "who's in
charge" in responding to a disaster is pretty clear- it's the Israeli Defence Force
(l OP). When disaster occurs. the on-scene IDF commander is in charge.
r spent some time with the Home Front Command in Israel and have some familiarity with the system of government in Israel. It is a system that is not fundamentally federal in character.
Looking back to the historic events of 1787. it is d ear that our founders created a
more complex web of authorities that is consciously embedded and carefully integrated into the US Constitution. Ours is a system of checks and balances. which
sounds pretty good until you have to m ount an effective response to a catastrophic
event. The theory of our Constitution-the wonderful theory of our Constitution-is that we preserve liberty through competition. We decentralize power
throughout the federal governm ent. But by federal I also mean the federal character of our government. which includes not just the national government but the
fifty state and thousands and thousands oflocal governments. We defuse power in
order to have a system of checks and balances. We have a Constitution that created
three eq ual branches of government so that no one branch of government would
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become too powerful and we gave certain powers to the national government and
reserved the remainder to the states.
We have provisions in the Constitution, including the Tenth Amendment,
guaranteeing certain authorities to the states, and others from the states to local
government. So we recognize-at least I recognize--that if we are to remain consistent with the Constitution, the issue is really not "who's in charge." Under our
Constitution, we will never have absolute unity of command. Our founders in their
wisdom didn 't want that . They dispersed power in a decentralized manner
throughout the various levels and branches of government. So our challenge is not
to achieve unity of command; our challenge is to achieve, in military terminology,
unity of effort within that system of decentralized authority, those checks and balances created by our founders. That requires very dose coordination and detailed,
integrated planning among all levels of government and between civilian authorities and military forces.
H.L. Mencken once said that for every complex problem, there is a solution that
is simple, neat and wrong. There is no simple solution consistent with a Constitution of checks and balances. It requires hard work, integrated planning, a common
understanding of the threat environment and careful consideration of foreseeable
missions in advance of a crisis so that in the context of checks and balances we
nonetheless achieve a unity of effort.

Conclusion
Forgive me fo r going on at such length, but I wanted to give you some sense of both
the complexity of the issues and the seriousness and purpose that have been
brought to those issues since September 11, 200 I. We know that the US military
has a tremendous ability to provide for the physical security of the American people, including the contingent missions related to domestic warfighting against foreign adversaries on our own soil if civilian law enforcement authorities are not
capable of meeting the perceived or very real threat. And, as was obvious in Hurricane Katrina, we in the Department of Defense have a very important role to play
in providing consequence management capabilities to augment and reinforce civilian authorities. But in the overall context of enhanced core missions evolving for
the military domestically in the twenty-first century, we have not forgotten the
cautionary words of Federalist 8. The achievement of security while maintaining
our liberty remains our fundamental commitment and our core responsibility.
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